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Elihu Katz and S. N. Eisenstadt 
Some Sociological Observations 
on the Response of Israeli Or- 
ganizations to New Immigrants 
Preliminary observation suggests that the contact between Israeli 
officials and newly arrived immigrants from traditional societies is con- 
siderably less "bureaucratic" than might have been predicted. For 
example, analysis of several cases of such bureaucrat-client relationships 
indicates that officials often add the role of teacher to their relatively 
specific roles as bureaucrats by teaching newcomers how to perform 
in the role. Moreover, the official often becomes not only a teacher 
but also a kind of informal leader. This indicates that under certain 
conditions, formal organizations may give birth to incipient social 
movements, a direction of organizational change wholly unanticipated 
in the theoretical literature. The case material is analyzed in terms of 
(1) a theory of role impingement in which bureaucratic roles are seen to 
become intertwined with roles that are bureaucratically irrelevant to 
the conduct of formal organization and (2) a theory of socialization 
where the official serves as socializing agent for his clients. 
Elihu Katz is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at 
the University of Chicago; S. N. Eisenstadt is professor of sociology and 
chairman of the department in the Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics 
and Social Sciences, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.' 
'This paper is a by-product of a collaborative effort to design research on the 
developing bureaucratic framework of immigrant absorption in Israel. In 1957-1958 
a research seminar on this topic was conducted by the authors at the Hebrew Uni- 
versity in Jerusalem. Participating in the seminar, and in the pilot study that 
emerged from it, were the following faculty members and students: Rivka Bar-Yossef, 
Batsheva Bonn6, Esther Carmeli, Nina Toren, Arie Eliav, Uri Horowitz, Rivka 
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THIS paper has its origin in preliminary observations on the pat- 
terns of contact between Israeli organizations and recent immi- 
grants from non-Western countries. The pilot study resulting from 
these observations is concerned, first with "the socialization of the 
client," that is, with the adaptation of newcomers from traditional 
familistic backgrounds to new role expectations such as those 
implicit in becoming a factory worker, a hospital patient, a client 
of a social welfare worker, or even a bus passenger. Secondly, the 
study is equally concerned with the changes that occur in the 
organizations themselves in response to the large influx of clients 
new to Western ways. It is to preliminary reflection on this second 
problem that the present paper is devoted. 
Rather than consider the organization as a whole, we are restrict- 
ing our focus to those officials having direct dealings with new 
immigrants. We are concerned, in other words, with the official- 
client relationship where the official is usually of European birth or 
parentage and where the client is a recent immigrant from a non- 
Western country. 
According to sociological theory, there was good reason to 
expect that the rapid influx of large numbers of new immigrants 
would increase the bureaucratization of the organizations to which 
they came.2 This meant that one could expect, first, an increasing 
impersonality of relations between bureaucrats and clients.3 One 
could also expect an increase in the degree of universalism- 
equality before the law-in the orientation of bureaucrat toward 
client. Similarly, the pressure of work resulting from the large 
influx ought to make the official more stringent in his enforcement 
of the rules. And, of course, one could expect official-client rela- 
tions to become more businesslike and specific, becoming more 
narrowly limited to officially relevant concerns. Finally, one 
Kaplansky, Yael Lissak, Pnina Morag, Dorit Pedan, Ozer Schild, Dov Weintraub, 
and Rina Zabelevsky. Mr. Schild and Mrs. Bar-Yossef are currently directing the 
pilot study, which is being supported, in part, by the Ford Foundation. We are 
indebted to Professors Peter M. Blau and David Riesman for a critical reading of an 
earlier draft. 
2An elaboration of the well-known Simmel hypothesis on the effects of the size of 
a group for the specific case of migration can be found in Frank E. Jones, A Soci- 
ological Perspective on Immigrant Adjustment, Social Forces, 35 (1956), 39-47. 
"In general, our use of the terms official (or bureaucrat) and client is meant to 
refer also to superior-subordinate relationships within an organization. 
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could expect the official to rely more heavily on the ascribed 
authority of his office and on the symbols and the power accom- 
panying it to get his job done.4 
These are some of the dimensions in which we expected to find 
changes in the official-client relationship as a result both of the 
large and rapid increase of clients and of the tensions arising 
from the radical cultural differences between officials and clients. 
We found such examples, of course, but we also found many 
examples of change in exactly the opposite direction. Rather than 
a marked increase in the degree of bureaucratization in official- 
client relations, we found evidence of debureaucratization. We 
often found officials relating to clients personally, taking sympa- 
thetic account of the status "new immigrant", and not confining 
themselves to their officially relevant roles. And frequently we 
found officials trying to get their job done, not so much by means 
of the power and symbols of office, but on the basis of exchange of 
services, or persuasion, or personal charisma. 
In the pages that follow, we shall try to explain how such 
relationships appear to arise. But it is important to bear in mind 
that these are, so far, only impressionistic observations. The pilot 
study and, ultimately, the full-scale research, we hope, will be 
better founded. 
THEORY AND RESEARCH ON BUREAUCRATIZATION 
In the broadest sense, the theoretical problem here deals with 
the conditions affecting the degree of bureaucratization of an 
organization, specifically of the bureaucrat-client relationship. We 
are interested in the factors that make for varying degrees of 
bureaucratization as well as the factors (presumably the same ones) 
that influence the direction of organizational change. Indeed, 
in the writings of Max Weber and Robert Michels the problem 
of organizational change is essentially identical with the theme of 
bureaucratization.5 If the classical sociological writings were con- 
4Here and elsewhere we make use of Parsons' terminology. Although we make an 
effort to communicate the meaning of the several concepts we employ, for a full 
discussion see Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 1951), ch. ii. 
5Max Weber, "The Presuppositions and Causes of Bureaucracy," in Robert K. 
Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and Hanan Selvin, eds., Reader in 
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cerned with bureaucratization, the later writings have devoted 
themselves to the problems of overbureaucratization. Thus, dis- 
cussions of deviations from the ideal-type bureaucracy outlined 
by Weber focused on overbureaucratization as a threat to the 
attainment of the very goals for which the organizations were 
established. The leading character in these discussions, the official 
who converts means into ends, has been frequently described both 
in literary and scientific publications. The same is true for the 
accompanying manifestations of exaggerated hierarchy and red 
tape., 
Recently, however, with the beginning of empirical research 
on organizational behavior, these assumptions about the unidirec- 
tional evolution of organizations have been put into broader per- 
spective. Thus, recent empirical research seems to suggest that (1) 
the trend toward total bureaucratization of organizations may 
sometimes be averted;7 (2) actual bureaucracies are compounded of 
nonbureaucratic elements also;8 (3) bureaucracies, once estab- 
lished, are by no means unchanging;9 and (4) when changes do 
Bureaucracy (Glencoe, 1952), 60-68. Of course, Weber was also concerned with the 
role of internal factors making for a greater degree of bureaucratization in the 
organization, a notable example being his discussion of "The Routinization of 
Charisma," which tends to develop when a group faces the problem of leadership 
succession, ibid., pp. 92-100. This also gives a brief statement of Robert Michels' 
argument (pp. 88-92), as does his Political Parties (Glencoe, 1949). 
"The best known of these essays is probably Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic 
Structure and Personality," in Merton et al., op. cit., pp. 361-371. 
7Seymour M. Lipset, Martin A. Trow and James S. Coleman, Union Democracy 
(Glencoe, 1956), try to specify the conditions that contribute, in at least one case, 
to the maintenance of trade-union democracy rather than oligarchic bureaucracy. 
8This, of course, refers to the dominant trend of present-day research, which has 
been concerned with the existence and the functions of informal social relations in 
the context of formal organization. But more important for our present purpose is 
the incipient concern for informal aspects of relationships between bureaucrats and 
the public. See, for example, Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright, and William Delany, 
Public Administration and the Public (Ann Arbor, 1958); Edwin J. Thomas, Role 
Conceptions and Organizational Size, American Sociological Review, 24 (1959), 30- 
37; and George F. Lombard, Behavior in a Selling Group (Cambridge, Mass., 1955). 
For a recent critique of the assumption that the several elements of Weber's ideal- 
type bureaucracy are necessarily intercorrelated, see Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "Bureauc- 
racy" and "Rationality" in Weber's Organization Theory, American Sociological 
Review, 24 (1959), 792-795. 
9See Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago, 1955), esp. ch. iii. 
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take place, they are not always in the direction of greater bureau- 
cratization and formalism.10 
Factors Affecting Bureaucratization in the Official-Client 
Relationship 
The literature provides a number of suggestions concerning 
the factors affecting bureaucratization in general. Weber's empha- 
sis has already been noted.11 Succession is another familiar exam- 
ple. When a new director takes over from a predecessor, he has 
little choice but to insist on relatively greater formal relations, to 
demand adherence to the appointed channels of communication, 
and the like.12 Another factor is monopolization. When an organi- 
zation has a monopoly on certain goods or services (as most public 
bureaucracies have, of course), there is little chance of effective 
protest on the part of the client and no possibility of recourse to 
a competitor; under such conditions, bureaucrats may permit 
themselves an attitude of detachment and ritualistic formalism 
vis-?-vis their clients.13 
The reverse of each of these influences should be associated with 
a lesser degree of bureaucratization. Thus, a smaller organization 
or one which suffers a reduction in size ought to be less bureau- 
cratic. So should an organization that is aware that its clients have 
a choice between it and a competitor. 
Each of these factors, of course, has its impact on the official- 
client or the superior-subordinate relationships.14 But there are 
other factors worth singling out for their specific impact on these 
relationships. It is well known, for example, that soldiers in com- 
bat relate to others and to their officers in a much less bureaucratic 
way than they do behind the front lines or in peacetime.15 Closely 
'0See Ralph H. Turner, "The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat," in 
Merton et al. op. cit., pp. 372-379. Also compare Blau, op. cit., for an example of 
the way in which variations in supervisory practice affected the extent to which 
employment agency officials used racial bias vis-lh-vis their clients. 
"Max Weber, "The Presuppositions and Causes of Bureaucracy," in Merton et al. 
op. cit., pp. 60-68. 
"2See Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, 1954), pp. 
59-101. 
12See Merton, op. cit., p. 369. 
"4For a discussion of the effect of size, see Thomas, op. cit. 
15Samuel A. Stouffer, et al. The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath 
(Princeton, 1949), p. 100. 
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related findings emerge from a study of the informal social organi- 
zation that superseded the formal organization of a naval unit 
on a tiny, unpopulated Pacific island.16 Similarly, workers on the 
night shift were treated differently by their supervisors than were 
day-shift employees,17 just as, in Gouldner's study, workers in the 
mine successfully resisted greater bureaucratization while office 
workers in the same company did not.'8 The common elements 
in these situations would seem to be the relative danger or unus- 
ualness of the task, the relative isolation from social contacts out- 
side the organization, and relative independence from the imme- 
diate presence of upper echelons in the hierarchy. One suspects 
that certain of these factors would also be appropriate to cases such 
as Diamond's study of the debureaucratization of a quasi-military 
group by early American settlers organized as the Virginia Com- 
pany.19 
As a final example of debureaucratization, Turner's study of the 
navy disbursing officer during wartime will serve particularly 
well.20 Turner indicated several factors that influenced these offi- 
cers to depart from the orientation prescribed by the rule book 
to establish more diffuse relations with some of their clients and 
to show favoritism. First, many clients of the disbursing officer 
were his superiors in rank and, consequently, his superiors in other 
role relationships. Secondly, he found it advantageous to help 
others who could reciprocate, such as the mess officer. This depend- 
ence, in part a function of his isolation from other social contacts, 
was embedded in a more general interdependence created by the 
war.2' Finally, client and bureaucrat were dependent on each 
other because, especially during the war, the higher authorities 
who were to be consulted in case of doubt were both physically 
and psychologically distant. 
This dependence of clients and officials on each other appears 
as a key factor in the other cases as well, and for much the same 
"Charles H. Page, Bureaucracy's Other Face, Social Forces, 25 (1946), 89-91. 
"Lipset et al., op. cit., p. 139. 
"Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 105-154. 
19Sigmund Diamond, From Organization to Society: Virginia in the 17th Century, 
American Journal of Sociology, 63 (1958), 588-594. 
2OTurner, op. cit. 
"'For example, Turner omits the interdependence based on the common danger. 
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reasons.22 The danger, the isolation, the aborted hierarchy of com- 
bat, the night shift, the mine, the Virginia Company, and the 
naval unit on the Pacific island made men dependent upon each 
other over and above the specific relations defined for them by 
their formal organizations. The attempt to enforce ordinary peace- 
time or daytime relations under such circumstances-that is, the 
attempt to behave in the accepted bureaucratic manner, or even 
more, to be overbureaucratic-is what apparently leads to deser- 
tion (where one is able to leave) or to mutiny (where one cannot). 
Role Impingement as a Characterization of Bureaucratization 
and Debureaucratization 
The notion of dependence may be viewed sociologically as a 
special case of the impingement of other role relationships on a 
given bureaucratic relationship. In Turner's study, for example, 
the observed debureaucratization could be considered a product 
of the regularized contacts in other roles that existed between the 
disbursing officer and his clients. Moreover, if debureaucratization 
may be characterized in terms of the impingement of nonbureau- 
cratic roles on bureaucratic ones, then overbureaucratization may 
be characterized as either the formalistic segregation of a bureau- 
cratic relationship from all other role relations (even relevant ones) 
or, in its totalitarian form, as the imposition of the bureaucratic 
relationship on relations outside the scope of the bureaucracy. 
The bureaucratic ritualist would be an example of one who arbi- 
trarily views all extrabureaucratic roles as irrelevant to the conduct 
of his office, while the totalitarian bureaucrat "takes his authority 
home," as, for example, the sergeant bullying his men off duty. 
In effect, overbureaucratization and debureaucratization repre- 
sent a disturbance in the relationship between an organization and 
its environment that is not envisioned by the classical model of 
bureaucracy. This model envisages the roles of both bureaucrat 
and client as segregated to some extent from their other roles; 
their roles are "specific" to the interaction setting and in this 
bureaucratic setting it is irrelevant, for example, that both bureau- 
"Note again that we are using "bureaucrat-client" in a generic sense, implying 
superordinate-subordinate relations (such as in combat, the mine, the Virginia Com- 
pany, etc.) as well. 
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crat and client belong to the same political club. However, even in 
the ideal-type bureaucracy a role is not completely independent of 
other roles; some outside roles clearly may be, or must be, consid- 
ered. If an old man, obviously unable to wait his turn in a long 
queue, is given special attention by a clerk, this is not a case of an 
irrelevant role relationship being allowed incorrectly to impinge 
on the bureaucrat-client relationship. In general, the classic model 
of bureaucracy requires only that the bureaucratic organization 
not be directly dependent on external factors for its manpower, its 
resources, or its motivation for carrying out its organizational 
task. If an organization relies directly upon any one segment of 
the population for financing, or for political protection, these 
sources of support will clearly receive particularistic attention in 
the dispensation of the organization's services. It is such direct 
dependence that mechanisms such as boards of trustees, budget 
bureaus, and the like try to avert by insulating bureaucratic 
organizations from their sources of support. What is true for the 
organization as a whole is true for its members as well. If a bureau- 
crat receives direct rewards from outside the organization in addi- 
tion to, or instead of, his rewards from within, obviously his inde- 
pendence of action as a bureaucrat is thereby reduced.23 
Clearly, then, there is a very delicate balance-varying from 
organization to organization-between the specific roles defined 
as relevant to relations within the bureaucracy and those outside 
roles defined as irrelevant. Note the parallel to our notion of role 
impingement in Gouldner's concept of "latent identity.P"24 
23To cite a familiar example, a civil servant looking to a political party for 
rewards for his performance in his role as civil servant may do so because he is a 
political appointee, because he is ideologically committed to his party, or for other 
reasons. 
WAfter developing this analysis of role impingement, we encountered Gouldner's 
concept and noted its close similarity. "It is necessary to distinguish," says Gouldner, 
"between those social identities of group members which are consensually regarded 
as relevant to them in a given setting and those which group members define as 
being irrelevant, inappropriate to consider, or illegitimate to take into account. 
The former can be called the manifest social identities, the latter, the latent social 
identities .... When group members orient themselves to the latent identities of 
others in their group, they are involved in a relationship with them which is not 
culturally prescribed by the group norms governing their manifest roles .... It 
ISRAELI ORGANIZATIONS 121 
ISRAELI OFFICIALS AND NEW IMMIGRANTS 
Increasingly, in recent years, the contact between immigrants 
and the new societies to which they have come are mediated by pro- 
fessionals and bureaucrats. The customs agent, the social worker, 
the policeman, the public health nurse, the housing administrator, 
-and the like, constitute the immigrants' main connections with the 
community to which they come, and it is these officials who pro- 
vide aid and advice, which in earlier migrations were obtained 
more informally or not at all. This change is characteristic not 
only of the reception of immigrants in present-day Israel but also 
of the reception of Puerto Ricans and southern Negroes in New 
York and Chicago, and of other immigrant groups in the areas 
receiving them.25 This change is in part a consequence of the 
greater bureaucratization of these areas in the last generation and 
in part a consequence of the theory and practice of the welfare 
state which, adapting itself to the immigrant, proffers many social 
services unknown to the immigrant of an earlier generation. In 
Israel, this change is also a consequence of the different pattern of 
motivation and different demographic composition of present-day 
would seem clear that latent identities and roles are important because they exert 
pressure upon the manifest roles, often impairing conformity with their require- 
ments and endemically threatening the equilibrium of the manifest role system." 
Gouldner goes on to give an example concerning deference to elders in a univer- 
salistic setting which is very similar to the one we have presented. See Alvin W. 
Gouldner, Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles, 
I and II, Administrative Science Quarterly, 2 (1957-1958), 281-306 and 444-480, esp. 
pp. 282-287. It should be noted also that the problem of role impingement or 
latent social identity differs from the problem of role conflict. Role impingement 
refers to the multiple role relations played by official and client vis-a-vis one another. 
Role conflict generally implies the multiple (and conflicting) roles of a given actor 
vis-h-vis several different others-e.g., the official's relationships to his wife and to 
his boss. Still a further distinction, recently introduced by Merton, is that of the 
role set, which has to do with the multiple role relations implicit in any given role 
-e.g., the official's relationship to his boss, his secretary, his colleagues, etc. Others 
who have employed analytic concepts similar to the concept of role impingement 
are Lloyd Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy (Cambridge, Eng., 1957); Frank Jones, "The 
Infantry Recruit: A Sociological Analysis of Socialization in the Canadian Army" 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard, 1956); and Thomas, op. cit. 
26A review, by Nathan Glazer, of several recent books treating Puerto Rican 
migration makes this point; see New York's Puerto Ricans, Commentary, 26 (1958), 
469478. 
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immigrants compared with the "pioneer" immigrants of the turn 
of the century.26 
The remainder of this paper is devoted to a preliminary discus- 
sion of some of the problems arising out of the contact between 
immigrants to Israel and the officials with whom they deal, viewed 
against the theoretical considerations set forth in the first part of 
this paper. The kind of immigrant with whom we are particularly 
concerned comes from non-Western countries (such as Yemen, 
Morocco, Iraq, and so on), where he is likely to have had little 
or no contact with formal organization. 
The question to which we now turn is why so many of the 
official-client relations observed seemed to be moving in the direc- 
tion of lesser bureaucratization. We do not mean to imply that 
Israeli organizations prior to the influx of the non-Western immi- 
grants were close approximations of the Weberian ideal-type; for 
the small size of the country and the common struggle made for 
wide networks of interpersonal relations embracing officials and 
clients alike. The pioneering and egalitarian ideologies frowned 
on status differentiation, differential distribution of rewards, as 
well as on formalities of all sorts. Not least important, political 
parties exerted considerable influence on appointments to and 
conduct of the public bureaucracies. 
As we have already said, the mere increase in organizational size 
and responsibility might have been expected to result in increased 
bureaucratization of relations between official and client, between 
supervisor and worker, and so forth. To this rapid increase in 
numbers add the divergence of cultural background between the 
majority of recent immigrants coming from non-Western countries 
and the European bureaucrats dealing with them, and one would 
certainly expect an increase in bureaucratic formalism.27 
Yet our preliminary observations indicate that this is not the 
case. We have, of course, found some evidence of increasing 
bureaucratization as a response to the influx of new immigrants. 
26See S. N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (Glencoe, 1955), pp. 64- 
68, and 172 ff., "The Framework of Bureaucratic Absorption." 
27In 1948, at the time of the establishment of the state of Israel, persons born in 
Africa and Asia constituted 15 per cent of the population; five years later, in 1953, 
they constituted 38 per cent of the population. See Moshe Sicron, Immigration to 
Israel: 1948-1953 (Jerusalem, 1957), pp. 43-50. 
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Thus, in one co-operative organization, for example, the hierarchy 
became sharply elongated. Previously any member was able to 
reach the highest official of the organization rather directly and 
informally, nor was it particularly important whether he 
brought his problem to one or another of the top officials. Now, 
the same organization has developed a strict chain of command 
and a new immigrant with a problem must proceed strictly 
through the established channels and talk only to the relevant 
official. Yet, even in this organization, as far as the actual inter- 
action between official and client is concerned, there is evidence 
of considerable debureaucratization. 
Repeatedly, however, we have found in institutions as diverse 
as health clinics and bus companies, widespread evidence of de- 
bureaucratization in the relationship between officials and new 
immigrants. We have found cases where the official has assigned 
himself a greater number of tasks vis-a-vis his clients than those 
assigned him by his organization. We find considerable evidence 
of the growth of personal relationships between officials and new 
immigrants. We have even found cases where the official becomes 
the leader of a kind of "social movement" composed of new immi- 
grants, thus completely reversing the expected trend which is sup- 
posed to lead from movements to bureaucracy. A major key to 
this unanticipated phenomenon is the notion of dependence we 
have developed, which takes quite a different form at this point. 
We shall try to describe what we think we have found and, in part, 
we shall do this in terms of case studies. In one case, officials 
assumed a teaching role vis-a-vis their clients. In another, officials 
departed from their prescribed role as agents of socialization in 
certain patterned ways. In the third case, officials became the lead- 
ers of an incipient social movement. 
Bureaucrats as Teachers: Dependence on the Client's 
Performance of His Role 
The most characteristic form of debureaucratization in the 
relationship between bureaucrats and new immigrants in Israel 
is the assumption by the bureaucrat of the role of teacher along 
with (or at the expense of) his other functions. Consider, for 
example, the bus driver who gets out of the bus to teach the idea 
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of a queue-"first come, first served" -an idea which is new to 
many of his new immigrant passengers. Similarly, the nurse at the 
well-baby clinic may be seen teaching women, informally, which of 
their needs are appropriate to the health services and which 
should be taken to other organizations. Or, the manager of the 
government-subsidized grocery in the new immigrant settlement 
may take the initiative and go into homes to teach housewives how 
to prepare certain foods with which they have had no previous 
experience. 
In all these examples, the bureaucrat takes the time and effort 
to teach a client something about his (the bureaucrat's) expec- 
tations concerning how the client role is to be played. In other 
words, the bureaucrat teaches the client how to be a client so that 
he (the bureaucrat) can go on being a bureaucrat. This, it seems 
to us, is a form of dependence, but one which we have not con- 
sidered so far; it is dependence on the client to act in a way which 
makes it possible for the bureaucrat to do his job. 
In other words, it is expected by the bureaucrat and the bureauc- 
racy that the client will bring with him to the bureaucratic context 
certain knowledge of expected roles from "outside," even though 
he may have had no previous contact with this particular bureauc- 
racy. In Western society, for example, one is prepared for one's 
first encounter with a customs inspector by virtue of one's single- 
purpose relationships with other officials, tradesmen, and the like. 
When this preparation is lacking, the bureaucrat himself, in the 
examples cited, added a dimension-teaching-to his relationship 
with the client. And this change is an example of debureaucratiza- 
tion both because it adds another role to the specifically prescribed 
one and because the quality of interaction in the teacher-student 
relationship necessarily impinges on the more formal bureaucrat- 
client relationship. Yet these are the very elements which are 
officially alien to the ideal-type bureaucracy.28 What is more, as we 
shall presently see, the teaching relationship may bring further 
debureaucratization, although conceivably it may simply permit 
the bureaucrat to perform his role as originally prescribed. 
-"This would be particularly true when a bureaucrat's aim is to bring his client 
to want the bureaucrat's services; thus, this might be more true of a storekeeper 
than a nurse, and more true of a nurse than a bus driver. 
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Consider the case of the bus driver. Introductory texts in sociol- 
ogy like to cite the driver-passenger relationship as an example of a 
purely instrumental, secondary relationship. Neither party matters 
to the other as an individual. One would not expect the bus 
driver to modify his behavior vis-a-vis new immigrants or anybody 
else, yet our preliminary observations seem to indicate that he 
does. Like other bureaucrats who come into contact with new 
immigrants, the bus driver tends to assume a teaching role, too. 
Besides trying to teach the idea of queuing, bus drivers were 
observed trying to persuade immigrant passengers that the cost of 
a ride on one bus was the same as the cost on the bus that had 
just gone by, or that the driver did not personally profit from each 
fare he collected, or that the decision for the bus to leave the 
terminal was not his. The consequences of the formal organiza- 
tion of a bus company that are understood by client and bureau- 
crat in modern society are simply not "obvious" to the non-West- 
ern immigrant. 
Moreover, we have the impression-and the research now in 
progress will permit confirmation-that a kind of joking relation- 
ship grows up between drivers and new-immigrant passengers. 
This seems to be the case particularly where the passengers in the 
bus know one another-as in buses serving suburban settlements 
and city neighborhoods populated largely by new immigrants. In- 
deed, drivers on routes with concentrations of new immigrants 
have told us explicitly that they consider it desirable to get to 
know their passengers personally, because a new driver is likely 
to encounter "trouble" with non-Western immigrants, who may 
become unruly or begin to ask the usual questions anew: "How 
much is the fare?" "May I get off here?" and so on. In fact, we 
have had some indication that the bus companies recognize the 
desirability of less frequent changes of drivers on lines serving new 
immigrants. This "personalization" of the bureaucratic relation- 
ship represents a deviation from the impersonal, universalistic, 
specific relationship between driver and passenger which, in princi- 
ple, ought to be unaffected by the substitution of one driver for 
another. It is an example of debureaucratization, which is the 
product of the dependence of the bureaucrat on the client's ability 
and motivation to perform his role as client. 
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It is important to note, however, that an official's dependence 
on the client to perform his role is probably of a different order 
from the kinds of dependence we discussed in the other examples 
reviewed in the first part of this paper. In the earlier examples, the 
client actually had power over the bureaucrat-he could affect 
his well-being both as a member of the bureaucratic organization 
and as an individual. Thus, the clients of the disbursing officer 
were his superiors in other relationships, or the men in combat or 
in the mine could withdraw their reciprocal protection of their 
superior. In the present instance, however, the passenger has power 
over the driver in very much the same sense that a baby has power 
to disrupt the family schedule, and clearly this creates dependence 
of quite a different order.29 
Bureaucrats as Socializing Agents 
The process of a bureaucrat stepping outside his role to teach 
a new immigrant how to act his role as client is highly reminiscent 
of the processes of socialization and social control as analyzed by 
Parsons.80 In the socialization of the child, or in the process of psy- 
chotherapy, the socializing agent steps out of his place in the larger 
social system and assumes a role in the "deviant" subsystem. 
Thus, the mother is a member of the inclusive family system con- 
sisting of father, mother, and children. To bring a new child into 
this more inclusive system, she must use her role in the earlier 
mother-child subsystem and selectively reward the child for obe- 
dience and disobedience to the new expectations of the inclusive 
system while at the same time providing a basis of support for the 
child in his effort to learn the new role. At times, however, the 
mother may fail as socializing agent, because she herself prefers 
29Replying to the query whether the "dependency" of the child does not some- 
times confer power equal to or superior to that of the person on whom dependency 
exists, Parsons distinguishes between power defined as "relative importance in 
carrying out the functional performance of the system" and as the "ability to cause 
trouble by threatening to disrupt the system." In this latter sense, "the child, and 
other persons or groups in dependent positions have considerable 'power.'" See 
Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, Family, Socialization and Interaction Process 
(Glencoe, 1955), p. 46, n. 18. It is this second type of power which concerns us at 
this point. 
'0lbid., ch. ii. 
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to remain in the "deviant" subsystem and, ignoring the father and 
the rest of the family, acts to "keep the child for herself." 
The parallel seems striking to us. The assumption of a teaching 
role by the bureaucrat and the "personalizing" of the bureaucrat- 
client relationship seems to function for the process of immigrant 
socialization as does the behavior of the socializing agent vis-a-vis 
the child. One of the objects of our empirical study will be to 
determine whether this kind of bureaucratic behavior (whatever 
its dysfunctions for the organizational routine) contributes more 
to the adaptation of the new immigrant than the unbending 
bureaucrat-client relationship. 
Even more striking, perhaps, is the parallel to the kind of 
mother who "keeps the child for herself." Thus, a bureaucrat who 
has assumed a teaching role may fail to bring the new immigrant 
client to play the role expected of him by the bureaucracy and 
may, instead, remain a member of the "deviant" subsystem. This 
possibility is most conspicuous perhaps in the case of the village 
instructors who are assigned to each new settlement of immi- 
grants. These instructors are part of a regional Settlement Author- 
ity which, in turn, is part of a nationwide Settlement Depart- 
ment. Sometimes, instead of mediating between the new immi- 
grants and the authorities, the instructor becomes so much a part 
of his village community that his major effort is devoted to "rep- 
resenting" the interests of his clients vis-at-vis the authorities. 
The village instructor typically lives among his clients and is 
potentially available all day long. His job, as compared with the 
bus driver's, is a highly diffuse one and includes teaching the set- 
tlers, who were semiskilled craftsmen or peddlers, to be farmers, 
co-operators (as this is understood in the moshav)31 and Israelis. 
In this case debureaucratization is manifested not merely in the 
establishment of informal relations, but rather in the surrendering 
of part of the bureaucrat's commitment to his bureaucracy in 
31See S. N. Eisenstadt, Sociological Aspects of the Economic Adaptation of 
Oriental Immigrants in Israel: A Case Study of Modernization, Economic Develop- 
ment and Cultural Change, 4 (1958), 269-278; and Alex Weingrod, From the Millah 
to the Moshav: Culture Contact and Change in a New-Immigrant Village in Israel 
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1959). 
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favor of acceptance of a role in the system which he is expected 
to change. 
Of course, this is only one of the ways that the instructor- 
given his highly diffuse and flexible role-can shape his relations 
with his clients. Some instructors, obviously, take quite the oppo- 
site position. Their control of the resources necessary for the very 
existence of their clients permits them to move in the direction 
of overbureaucratization. They may interfere in matters'-religious 
observance, for example-which ought properly to be outside their 
(very broad) spheres of influence. 
An even more complicating factor is that the instructor, apart 
from his bureaucratic role, is often eager to make his clients full- 
fledged members of the nationwide small-holders co-operative 
movement or even of his political party, and to have them identify 
with its ideology, participate in its activities, and so on. Among the 
instructors who play this double role-which is by no means 
always considered illegitimate by the upper echelon of the Settle- 
ment Authority-many tend to view the various aspects of their 
bureaucratic role of training immigrants in agriculture and admin- 
istration as a means to the end of full citizenship. This goal, for 
the ideologically oriented Israeli, implies the assumption of poli- 
tical and ideological commitments. Such instructors aim at making 
their clients members of a solidary movement of which they them- 
selves are a part. This subsidiary aim makes the instructor even 
more dependent on the settlers. They may easily threaten not to 
participate in the movement unless the instructor provides them 
with various benefits and allocations for which he is the inter- 
mediary, though these may not be their due. In response the 
instructor may either move in the direction of debureaucratization 
and succumb to these demands, or he may attempt to use his 
bureaucratic position to force the clients to assume the political 
and ideological roles he envisages for them. 
Bureaucrats as Leaders 
A bureaucrat serving as "representative" or as "organizer" of 
his clients is by no means the extreme example of the kind of 
debureaucratization which may result from the bureaucrat's as- 
sumption of the role of socializing agent. Sometimes bureaucrats 
become charismatic leaders of groups of their clients. 
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Consider, for example, the case of several nurses employed 
at a well-baby clinic in a relatively segregated immigrants' "transi- 
tional community" within one of the major cities. In this setting 
the nurse-like the village instructor-is expected to be a teacher 
and to establish the kind of relationship required for successful 
teaching. Thus, along with the curative and preventive medicine 
practiced in such clinics, she must teach the women how to care 
for themselves and for their children in the particular manner 
prescribed by the modern scientific and philosophical orientation 
of the well-baby clinic. The authority of the nurses observed, how- 
ever, extended beyond these rather broadly defined functions. 
They became generalized counselors and the clinic soon took on 
the air of a kind of social center where women gathered to greet 
each other, to gossip, and to move within the orbit of the nurses. 
Some of the nurses had become preoccupied with the position 
of women in non-Western families. Apparently, this particular 
problem had first attracted attention as a result of the frequently 
negative reactions of their clients' husbands to one or another of 
the practices recommended by the clinic. Having thus become 
sensitized to the subordinate role of their clients within their 
families, the nurses added the reconciliation of family conflict to 
their counseling efforts and, in fact, some of the nurses considered 
it part of their job to teach women their "rights" vis-at-vis their 
husbands. In several instances, we have even heard nurses recom- 
mending divorce to their clients! Step by step, then, these nurses 
seem to have moved out from their broad but relatively well- 
defined functions (which include teaching) to assume an even 
broader teaching and counseling role and, in some instances, to 
leadership of a kind of "suffragette" movement among their clients. 
In such cases, the leader does not appear averse to illustrating her 
message with reference to her own private life or that of her 
friends. And to the extent that they follow, the clients look to their 
leaders for active support and guidance, and to sharing in the con- 
sequences of their behavior. 
The leadership role, as played by the bureaucrat, represents a 
considerable degree of debureaucratization. It represents, in part, 
exchange of the authority vested in the bureaucratic office for the 
"voluntary" loyalty of clients; that is, such leadership exists not 
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only by virtue of an "appointment" but by virtue of being 
"chosen" by followers as well. To that extent, the bureaucrat must 
submit himself to the authority, and to some of the norms, of his 
followers. Moreover, he has considerably extended the sphere of 
his influence from the specific tasks assigned to him to the wider, 
more diffuse, tasks inherent in the leadership role. 
DIRECTION OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
The variety of official relations with new immigrants in Israel 
provides us with a unique opportunity to locate the conditions 
under which debureaucratization, overbureaucratization, or both 
these organizational changes take place. Thus, we would expect 
debureaucratization to occur more often in relatively isolated set- 
tlements of new immigrants than in immigrant communities 
within the larger cities. In the isolated settlement the bureaucrat 
is far more dependent on the voluntary co-operation of his clients, 
both for the performance of his task and for his social and emo- 
tional (i.e. nonbureaucratic) well-being. One would also expect a 
greater dilution of the bureaucratic role with the teaching role in 
situations where a community of immigrants is transplanted more 
or less at the same time, compared with situations where migration 
was stretched over a long period of time. Under the former con- 
ditions, the immigrant community will have had less opportunity 
to educate itself and to develop the leaders, intermediaries, and 
interpreters who permit the bureaucrat to play his role uninter- 
ruptedly. In both the isolated immigrant community and in the 
transplanted immigrant community, the "segregated" equilibrium 
between the organization and its environment is likely to be more 
upset, and hence more marked organizational change may be 
anticipated. In both these cases, one might argue that the direc- 
tion of change might well be toward greater, rather than lesser, 
bureaucratization in the sense that the organization has a unique 
opportunity to impose itself on more aspects of its clients' lives 
than is usual. Our hypothesis holds otherwise, as we have tried to 
argue above, but the plausibility of the competing hypothesis 
illustrates how the two ostensibly opposite directions of organi- 
zational change stem from closely similar conditions. 
Our study will enable us to make other comparisons, too. For 
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example, we can compare bureaucrats who come into contact with 
clients of their own ethnic origin with bureaucrats whose clients 
are not of their own group. We can compare bureaucrats who are 
relatively isolated from contacts with their colleagues-instructors 
who live in the villages-with those who live among their col- 
leagues in the newly built Rural Centers and commute daily to 
the nearby villages. In the same way, we can compare the pattern 
of official-client relations characteristic of the bus companies whose 
drivers have only sporadic and brief contact with their new 
immigrant clients to the behavior of bureaucrats in organiza- 
tions which require more extended contacts. 
Again, it is easier to choose the situations in which deviation 
from the ideal bureaucratic norm is more likely to occur than it is 
to predict the direction of the deviation. Thus, when the bureau- 
crat is confronted primarily by clients of his own group he is likely 
to move either in the direction of bureaucratic formalism, studi- 
ously seeking to demonstrate his rootedness in Israeli life and to 
resist the particularistic expectations of the relative newcomers to 
Israel, or he may move in the direction of debureaucratization in 
the sense of reaccepting portions of the pattern of traditional 
authority and behavior of which he was once a part. Compared 
to the bureaucrat dealing with members of his own ethnic group 
(who may, because of his better understanding of the group, be 
more successful in his task), the bureaucrat without an ethnic affili- 
ation with his clients will display more affective neutrality, though 
this may still lead to overbureaucratization. Again, we expect to 
find that bureaucrats in close touch with their colleagues can main- 
tain a more detached, objective, service-oriented attitude to their 
clients than bureaucrats dependent on their clients for social and 
emotional acceptance and interaction. And, for the same reason, 
we expect bureaucrats with more extended contacts with a given 
group of clients to depart from the norms of bureaucratic behavior 
to a greater extent than bureaucrats with relatively brief and less 
regular contact. 
In this report of preliminary observations on the contact 
between Israeli organizations and the mass immigration from non- 
Western countries into Israel in recent years, we have tried to 
formulate an approach to the study of organizational change, par- 
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ticularly to change in the official-client relationship in response to 
this new kind of clientele. 
Contrary to the expectations of classical sociological thinking, 
we have considerable impressionistic evidence pointing to a process 
of decreasing bureaucratization, at least in the relations between 
immigrant-clients and those parts of the bureaucracy which come 
into contact with them. We have tried to explain this finding by 
reference to the constraints operating on the bureaucrat who 
comes into contact with the public to train the immigrant client 
to perform the client role in order that he (the bureaucrat) may 
perform his own role adequately. 
It seems to us that this process implies a certain kind of depend- 
ence on the client as far as the bureaucrat is concerned. Specific- 
ally, the bureaucrat is dependent on the client's proper perform- 
ance of the client role, although in a different sense than the client 
is dependent on the bureaucrat's performance of his. Beyond this, 
the kinds of situations we are exploring include those where the 
bureaucrat may look to his client for sociability, or may recognize 
him as a member of the same ethnic group, or may seek to enlist 
his client in other organizations of which he is a member. All these 
exemplify situations of heightened dependence and, presumably, 
greater deviations from bureaucratic norms. 
We have tried to suggest that the various forms of dependence 
which we found to be related to the process of debureaucratization 
may be subsumed under the more general heading of the articu- 
lation of role relations in modern society. The bureaucrat-client 
relationship is presumed to be segmented in certain ways from 
other kinds of social relations. Variations in the degree to which a 
given role relationship is insulated from other role relationships 
affects the degree of its bureaucratization. Thus, the process of 
debureaucratization may be characterized as an impinging of non- 
bureaucratic roles, or of other bureaucratic roles, on the specific 
bureaucratic role in question, while overbureaucratization may 
be expressed either in terms of the artificial insulation of the 
bureaucratic relationship from all other roles (however relevant) 
or, in its more totalitarian form, in the impinging of the bureau- 
cratic relationship on relations not relevant to the bureaucratic 
role. 
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We have tried to set down some theoretical guidelines for a dis- 
cussion of the problems of organizational change, with specific 
reference to the official-client relationship in a situation where 
there has been a rapid influx of immigrants having little previous 
contact with formal organization. We have tried to show that, in 
Israel, the process of decreasing bureaucratization is not an uncom- 
mon response in this situation, although we wish to emphasize 
that both increasing and decreasing bureaucratization may find 
simultaneous expression in different parts of the organization and, 
sometimes, in the very same relationship between official and 
client. It remains for the pilot study now in the field and the 
projected full-scale study to substantiate the general approach 
and the specific hypotheses we have proposed. 
